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Kennedy: Just Compensation

Most textbooks in business ethics have a puzzling structure. They
commonly begin with a survey of ethical theories, revised at times to include a
theory du jour or two, before proceeding to a discussion of issues. Depending
upon the inclinations of the author the issues typically fall into two categories:
abstract questions (“Is capitalism morally legitimate?”) or exceptions (“When is
whistle-blowing a duty?”). What is absent in all of the standard texts – and this is
the puzzling part – is a treatment of the basic duties of business professionals.1
There are few discussions of what it means to treat customers fairly, in price, in
quality, in advertising and marketing. Obligations to communities are reduced to
the category of corporate social responsibility, for which one must read “corporate
philanthropy.” And what is more pertinent to this paper, there are virtually no
systematic discussions of the employer-employee relationship and the
professional responsibilities that it creates.2
DO MANAGERS HAVE A DUTY TO BE FAIR?
Notwithstanding the tendency of thinkers who are committed to certain
financial models of business, the employment relationship cannot be reduced to
an exchange of cash (or cash equivalents) for labor. It is a rich and complex
human relationship that can be very fruitful and rewarding, but it imposes a
variety of obligations on both employers and employees.3 One of the most
Robert Kennedy is professor and chair of the Department of Catholic Studies at the University of
St Thomas (St Paul, MN) and co-director of the University’s Terrence J Murphy Institute for
Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy. He also holds a joint appointment (as professor in the
Department of Ethics and Business Law) in the College of Business, where he served as Chair of
the Faculty in 2004-05. More specifically, Kennedy’s research interests have focused on topics in
professional ethics and problems in contemporary society. He has written articles on corporate
social responsibility, professionalism, spirituality in the workplace, wealth creation, and ethical
investment, as well as a variety of issues related to culture and public life. His book, The Good
that Business Does, was published by the Acton Institute in 2006.
1
In this regard, business ethics texts are quite different from ethics texts in other professional
areas, such as law, medicine, and the military.
2
Once again, the exceptions tend to dominate or ethical considerations give way to the details of
employment law. We see discussions about wages or working conditions in less-developed
countries, or about affirmative action, or even about safety and workplace hazards. What we do
not see is a systematic exploration of the requirements of professionalism concerning the
management of employees.
3
Many of these obligations are reciprocal in nature. For example, employers must provide a safe
workplace, but employees must exercise reasonable caution. Employers must be loyal to
employees and not dismiss them for frivolous reasons, but employees must not take advantage of
employers to leverage themselves into more rewarding positions elsewhere. Employers should
be candid with employees, but employees must be discreet and protect confidential information.
And employers should compensate employees fairly, but employees must work diligently.
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sensitive and important of these obligations is the duty of employers to
compensate their employees fairly.4 This assumes that the concept of “fair
compensation” has meaning and that it is within the control of employers.
Even where there is agreement that employers ought to pay their
employees fairly, there is considerable disagreement about what constitutes
fairness in particular cases. A common objection throughout the history of this
issue is the claim that employers have no real duty to pay employees fairly
because fair compensation, or fair prices for that matter, cannot be accurately
calculated. In response, we should recognize from the beginning that, like so
many other things in business, this is essentially a matter of prudence, not precise
formulas.5 That is to say, fairness in compensation can never be a matter of
calculating a precise dollar amount, the slightest deviation from which would
constitute real unfairness. Fair compensation is instead a range, more narrow in
some cases than others, and never susceptible of being verified or determined
with scientific precision by a formula. Furthermore, a determinate judgment about
compensation often involves the consideration of a number of factors, many of
them immeasurable and almost all of them subject to variation (more on this
later).
As a consequence, a discussion of fairness in compensation as a practical
matter cannot hope to produce a system or a formula that can enable an
inexperienced or incompetent manager to calculate the value of a compensation
package. Instead, we must aim at a set of principles or guidelines that can shape
and inform the judgments of a prudent manager. This is the objective of this
paper. That being so, the paper will not consider the wisdom or justice of
particular public policies designed to bring about justice in compensation; still
less will it address means for bringing about changes in public policy.6
Another objection is that fairness in compensation, or prices, is best
produced, or only produced, by a market. Employers (and still less government
4

5

6

My concern in this paper will principally be to address the responsibilities of managers (as
professionals) to employees and, with one exception, not to consider the reciprocal duties of
employees.
Properly speaking, prudence is not synonymous with caution but is instead sound judgment
about practical matters. The prudent person knows what goals are genuinely worth pursuing and
knows how to accomplish them; sometimes caution is required and sometimes risks must be
taken. In regard to judging fairness in compensation (and many other employment matters), the
prudent person is able to assess and balance the various factors that must be taken into
consideration in the concrete.
Much of the current literature (i.e., from the last 25 years) on fairness in wages addresses just
these issues. Very little takes on the questions of principle. An exception is an article by my
colleague, Michael Naughton, “Distributors of Justice: A Case for a Just Wage.” America (27
May 2000).
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agencies) cannot hope to do deliberately what the market, the “invisible hand,”
does without conscious human direction. At the very least, employers attempting
to pay fairly are just as likely to introduce unintended and undesirable
consequences.
This objection might be compelling (as it generally is in the case of prices)
if it were true that a real, properly functional market exists for employment and
that market forces usually determine compensation rates without other deliberate
interventions. A properly functional market exists where there are multiple buyers
and sellers – in this case multiple employers and numerous employees available to
work – and where there are no significant factors that would interfere with the
operation of the market. A market of sorts certainly exists for employment but this
market may frequently fall short of being properly functional.7 As a result, market
forces alone are not sufficient to ensure fairness in compensation.
On the assumption that compensation ought to be fair, the challenge is to
determine on what principles and by what practices fairness might be achieved.
WHICH JUSTICE?
As Aristotle famously observed, justice (or fairness) is of two kinds.8 One kind is
concerned with the equality of exchanges between two parties and the other has to
do with the distribution of shares of a common resource to members of a
community of some sort.
The first sort of justice Aristotle called “rectificatory,” by which he meant to
suggest that a just exchange rectifies or makes things right between the parties to
the exchange. It is also often called “commutative” justice or exchange justice.
Such justice is exemplified in sales transactions, where each party believes that he
has received something of value at least equal to what he has given up. It is also
7

A market produces fairness in prices (and compensation rates are prices of a sort) when three
conditions are satisfied. First, buyers and sellers must negotiate freely, which means at minimum
that each must be genuinely free to accept or decline an offer. Second, buyers and sellers must
each have adequate information about what is to be exchanged, which we may assume usually to
be the case in employment. Third, neither buyers nor sellers are under unusual pressure to buy or
sell. In my judgment, the third condition is often violated in employment markets. In many
cases, the need for workers to find work is so disproportionate to the need for an employer to
hire that the worker is often under unusual pressure to “sell” his work. Or the high cost to a
current employee of finding alternate employment rather than accepting a compensation package
may also impose significant constraints. Of course, analogous pressures and constraints may also
apply to employers but probably not so frequently. In any event, the three conditions may fail to
be satisfied frequently enough to preclude relying on employment markets to produce fairness in
compensation.
8
See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, for the classic discussion of the nature and kinds of
justice.
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exemplified in situations where one party must compensate the other for harm
done, whether that harm is personal injury or property damage. On some
accounts, retributive punishment is made morally legitimate by the obligation of
the criminal to give up something of value (e.g., his freedom) in return for the
harm he has caused the civil community. In any event, the fundamental rule for
commutative justice is that whatever is given up by one party in an exchange must
be equal to what he receives.9
The second sort of justice, which we call “distributive,” is more subtle and
complicated. It comes into play only within a community of some kind (families,
clubs, businesses, and societies are all kinds of communities) and concerns the
criteria for distributing shares of a resource belonging to a community fairly to
members of that community. This also requires a person (or a group of persons)
who will make concrete judgments about how to distribute that resource. The
fundamental rule for distributive justice is that persons who are alike in relevant
ways must be treated in the same way (which means that they must be given equal
shares) but that persons who are different in relevant ways should be treated
differently.
For example, children in a family have a highly developed sense of justice.
They are acutely sensitive to failures on the part of parents to treat each child
exactly as the others are treated. In many cases they are right to expect identical
treatment, whether it involves sharing a limited supply of cookies or establishing
curfews. To the extent that the children are the same, distributive justice demands
that they be treated in the same way. However, sometimes there are relevant
differences between children, even if the children do not see this or will not admit
it. A family’s stock of medicine should be used only for the children who are ill.
Sometimes treats are fairly given only to those children who have done their
chores, finished their homework, or what not. And sometimes children who have
not adequately demonstrated their maturity and trustworthiness require more
restrictive curfews.
As we will see below, the problem of fairness in compensation is sometimes a
matter of commutative justice and sometimes a matter of distributive justice. The
difference is critical.

9

There can be a certain subjectivity to commutative justice since in voluntary exchanges we often
value what we receive more highly than what we give up. We may also see situations in which
something is highly valued by one person (a collector, for example) that another might not value
at all.
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A BIT OF HISTORY
Deeply rooted in the Western legal tradition is a reverence for the freedom
of individuals to enter into contracts and to fix the terms of these contracts by
voluntary negotiation. From Roman times at least, legal authorities have been
strongly disposed to presume the justice of such contracts and to enforce them.
Over the past century or two this freedom to contract (and the presumption of
justice that follows upon it) has come to be a distinguishing characteristic of
employment agreements. It seems quite natural to us that employers and
employees should freely negotiate and define their relationship by contracts, but
this has not always been so.
The Industrial Revolution of the 19th century profoundly reshaped the
lives of countless workers. Prior to the 19th century, it was quite common for
communities to fix wage rates for a variety of occupations. While it is true that
more often than not the intention in fixing wage rates was to establish a maximum
wage in order to stabilize prices and discourage the migration of skilled workers,
it is nonetheless also true that the authority of civil rulers and guilds to do this was
widely accepted. In time the wage rates of a great many occupations, perhaps
most, were fixed either by law or by common practice (and so were “customary”).
Communities were thus protected from wage-driven inflation, but workers were
also given some protection from unjust employers.
The insatiable appetite of industrial capitalism for workers – especially
unskilled and semi-skilled workers for factory positions – changed all that. There
were no statutory or customary wages for workers in new industrial occupations,
nor was there a solid precedent for understanding the new relationship between
employers and employees.10 Ancient and customary relationships dissolved and
new, less formal ones replaced them. Labor markets emerged where owners
offered work at a particular wage and workers either accepted or sought better
terms elsewhere. This gave rise to a new moral problem, in practice if not
conceptually.

10

It is not a novelty, of course, that one person be employed by another, but employment prior to
the Industrial Revolution tended to fall into categories that no longer seemed to fit. Employees
in factories were not serfs under local landowners nor were they tenants. They were not
apprentices bound to a craftsman, nor were they quite servants subject to masters. When their
numbers were proportionately low, the law could treat them as if they did fit one or another of
these categories, which in fact it continued to do long after industrial employment became
commonplace. Absent a formal contract, the legal framework for thinking about employment
has often been the master/servant model, though in recent decades the use of this model has
eroded. Nor are most employees really independent contractors, as they often lack
independence both in whether they will be employed and in how they will conduct their work.
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In principle, employers and employees entered into their relationship
voluntarily after having negotiated and agreed upon the wage rate and other terms
of employment. In practice, it was (and remains) far more likely that the employer
has much greater freedom and power to determine the terms of employment than
the employee. They do not meet as equals, as the legal doctrine of contractual
freedom assumes, but as parties who are decidedly unequal. In earlier centuries,
where wages and terms of employment were often determined by someone other
than the employer, the moral problem presented to the employer was essentially a
question of whether to comply with law and custom. In the modern world, it is de
facto the employer who must set the terms and so it is the employer, not the
lawgiver, who must determine not only what is possible but also what is just.
This moral problem is particularly important because in the modern world
employees are normally entirely dependent upon their wages to acquire the things
they and their families need to live. Custom does not provide them with a cottage
and a small plot of land; noblesse oblige does not ensure that they have enough to
eat. They must provide everything for themselves from their earnings. As a
consequence, those who have the power to determine wage rates also have the
duty to ensure fairness. If they are unwilling to do so, then perhaps they should be
prepared to surrender some of their liberty to shape the conditions of
employment.11
JOHN A RYAN AND A CHRISTIAN
CONCEPTION OF FAIRNESS IN COMPENSATION
Msgr John A Ryan (1869-1945) was a Catholic priest who spent most of
his career as a professor at the Catholic University of America in Washington,
DC. He was well known as an articulate advocate of progressive economic and
social policies. In 1906 he published his doctoral dissertation, A Living Wage, in
which he argued that employers had a firm obligation to reject setting wages by
“unlimited bargaining” (i.e., negotiation without constraint).12 Instead, he argued
that employers ought to commit themselves to establishing a minimum wage rate
on moral grounds, viz., the need of workers to obtain a livelihood, and to avoid
taking advantage of the economic weakness of workers to reduce wages. Ryan’s
work was very influential in debates surrounding the adoption by various states of
minimum wage legislation after 1911. His discussion of the issue, especially in
11

Laws and regulations are blunt and often unsatisfactory instruments for securing justice in the
workplace. We should not seek to impose them as remedies until it is clear that managers and
owners have failed in their professional responsibilities to pay workers fairly, to provide
adequately for their safety, to design jobs that are respectful of human dignity, etc.
12
John A Ryan, A Living Wage. (New York: Macmillan, 1906).
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his most important book, Distributive Justice, is considered by many to be a
classic treatment of the subject.13
In Distributive Justice Ryan argued that the needs of workers for food,
clothing, shelter and other requirements of human life must be taken into
consideration in determining fairness in wages, though not as the only factor.14 He
predicated this upon three principles.
First, the goods of the earth were intended by the Creator for the benefit of
all human creatures, i.e., to provide what is necessary for each person to lead a
materially decent human life. Since all persons are fundamentally equal in
dignity, no individual has a greater inherent claim than any other to these goods.
To put it another way, no individual can claim the right to possess more of the
goods of the earth than he may reasonably require in the face of the serious unmet
needs of others.
Second, Ryan insisted that this inherent right to share in the goods of the
earth became “actually valid” through productive labor. A person who was
unwilling to work when he or she was able to work forfeited this right to some
degree. Of course, children, the sick and disabled, and anyone unable to work did
not for that reason forfeit their right to a fair share.15
Third, those persons who actually control the distribution of the goods of
the earth have a duty to ensure fair, though not necessarily equal, access to these
goods. While this principle leads to a number of specific obligations, surely one
of them is that these persons must ensure that those who contribute their labor
receive a fair share of the available resources. Those who contribute more labor,
or more critical labor, may justly deserve a larger share (in most cases), but those
who make an adequate contribution are entitled to a minimally decent share. In
contrast with an “unlimited bargaining” principle, this right to a minimum share
would hold even in market conditions that would reach equilibrium at a lower
level.
This final principle rests upon the first two and it provides a foundation for
the claim that employers must not only attend to a “living wage” but must also
seek to be fair in all compensation decisions. With freedom to control use and
distribution comes the obligation to use well and distribute fairly.

13

John A Ryan, Distributive Justice, 3rd edition. (New York: Macmillan, 1942).
14
For this and the summary that follows, see Ryan, Distributive Justice, chapter 20.
15
It might be worth adding, too, that work here should be understood to be a broader category than
employment. A mother who remains home to care for young children may not be employed but
she is certainly engaged in work in the relevant sense.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2009

7

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 1 [2009], Art. 1

THE SHAPE OF THE PROBLEM
Msgr Ryan’s concern with wage fairness was focused on the urgent
problem of providing a minimally decent life to the working poor. He did not
discuss in any detail the broader problem of fairness in compensation at other
levels but this must be addressed if we are to develop a comprehensive
explanation.
Historically there have been several obstacles to developing such an
explanation. One, I submit, is the failure to recognize that employment can take
several different forms and that these different forms should not all be treated as
matters of commutative justice. Our commitment to contractual freedom as a
fundamental legal principle obscures this difference, as does the strong tendency
to individualism in the Western tradition. We simply have difficulty
acknowledging the social nature of human beings and the importance of a variety
of communities in human life.
Another obstacle has been the intense focus on the issue of minimum
wages. There is surely a matter of justice here but the whole question of fairness
in compensation cannot be reduced to this. Fair minimum compensation is, I
suggest, a subset of a larger problem, but its importance has tended to distract us
from other issues.
Before we can deal effectively with this larger problem, however, we must
be clear about the differences in the employment relationship.
SOME KEY DEFINITIONS
The definitions we need concern the nature of compensation and the
distinction between ordinary and non-ordinary employment.
Wages or Compensation?
Employment is a voluntary relationship in which the employee promises
to contribute a significant portion of his productive energies toward the
achievement of the objectives of another person or organization, and for which
contribution the employee receives something of value commensurate with the
value created by his efforts. We use the word “compensation” because the
employee forgoes opportunities to use his energies for other purposes, whether or
not these other purposes create economic value.
Significant changes in the nature of compensation have occurred over the
past century or so. For our purposes, the most important of these changes has been
the transition from cash wages for labor to a bundle of cash and non-cash benefits
which we may call compensation. In general, compensation may be understood to
be the set of benefits properly due to an employee from his employer or as a direct
result of his employment. In most cases, the dominant portion of compensation is a
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wage or salary, but over the past century non-wage compensation has grown
proportionately larger. This portion of compensation may exceed 40% of the
whole package. It may include ordinary benefits such as vacation days, a variety of
insurance and retirement benefits, family and sick leave, childcare, subsidized
purchases (e.g., stock, products and services), and educational subsidies.
Extraordinary benefits (usually available only to senior management) can include
cars, sabbaticals, stock options, low interest loans, and various personal services.16
Bonuses and gift incentives can be extraordinary benefits offered to a broad group
of employees.
This change in compensation from cash wages to a package of wages and
non-cash benefits sometimes obscures the real value of compensation. In order to
consider the fairness of what an employee receives as compensation for work, we
must make an estimate of the cash-equivalent value (to the employee) of the whole
compensation package, not merely the value of the wage portion.17
Ordinary Employees
There are a variety of circumstances under which people exchange a
certain amount of labor for something else of value. Not every one of these
circumstances constitutes an employment relationship. For example, one might
pay a neighborhood teenager a sum of money on one occasion to mow the lawn,
with no expectation on the anyone’s part that this will be a continuing chore.
Similarly, someone might take a temporary job, or a part-time job, with no
expectation or desire that the position will continue indefinitely or that it will lead
to promotion. A judgment about what constitutes fair compensation in any of
16

17

We should not lose sight of the fact that virtually all non-wage benefits can be converted to a
cash equivalent; at minimum we can estimate what it would cost an employee to purchase
something comparable directly. The recent public dismay at the unusual benefits enjoyed by
Jack Welch, the retired CEO of General Electric, shows how easy it is to miss this point. If
there is anything to be distressed about in Welch’s retirement agreement with GE, it is not that
he received free tickets or meals or even the use of a company plane. The only relevant question
is whether the overall cash value of the package is reasonable. To answer this question one
would have to know how much of his current income is deferred compensation from his
working years, how much is compensation for ongoing consulting, and so on. That some of his
income might be in non-cash benefits, perquisites, is entirely irrelevant.
This paper will not be concerned with the mechanics of making such estimates, but it is
important to keep in mind that a reasonable effort to make such an estimate is a prerequisite of
determining fairness in pay. To take a common example, it is probably not a moral obligation
binding on employers to provide health insurance coverage for their employees. However, there
may well be an obligation to provide, at least to some employees, sufficient cash income to
enable them to provide for their own health care. How the employer does this is immaterial; that
it be done may be crucial.
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these examples should differ in some respects from what should be expected of
what we might call ordinary employment.
We may understand an ordinary employee to be a properly qualified
employee working full-time (e.g., 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year) in a nonentry level position and expecting to support himself/herself and his/her family
from his/her earnings.
The relationship between an ordinary employee and an employer is not
merely an exchange of labor for cash, as may be true of other cases; it is
something far richer and more human. In some sense, to enter into ordinary
employment is to participate in the life of a community of work. In such a
community, one party offers all that he or she has to support the achievement of
the goals of the community. The other party has a corresponding responsibility to
ensure that the members of the community of work receive a fair share of the
wealth created or acquired by the community, which must be at least a wage
minimally sufficient to permit a decent human life.
Non-Ordinary Employees
In contrast with ordinary employment, all other forms of the employment
relationship are non-ordinary. The essential difference is that non-ordinary
employees are not full participants in a particular community of work. In practice,
this is to say that one or more of the following conditions is present: 1) the
employee is not yet properly qualified for the job, 2) the job is temporary, 3) the
job is part-time, or 4) the job is entry-level.
Many instances of non-ordinary employment are quite normal and
mutually satisfactory, though other instances may be unjust because they are a
deliberate effort on the part of employers to discourage or avoid ordinary
employment.18
Different forms of non-ordinary employment give rise to different
obligations on the part of the employer. Part-time employment, by its very nature
cannot be intended to provide everything an employee might need for a

18

This may occur, for example, where an employer hires several people on a part-time basis to do
the equivalent of a full-time job in order to avoid the obligation to provide non-cash benefits
(e.g., health insurance). On the other hand, it is not morally objectionable to offer part-time jobs
to those who prefer them (students, some parents or older workers) where there is no intention
to deny the employees a share of the goods they deserve to have. since the owner or manager
controls access to work and the benefits of work, he or she may have an obligation at times to
offer full-time employment so that a person can fulfill his needs through work.
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reasonably decent human life, and so the employer is not morally obligated to use
human need as a measure of compensation.19
Entry-level positions, which may be full- or part-time, are usually
temporary by nature. Employees in these positions generally lack the minimum
skill set or experience required for ordinary employment, but the implication is
that, other things being equal, the employee will move on to ordinary employment
once he or she is qualified. A menial, unskilled job which provides no opportunity
for the acquisition of job skills and from which employees are seldom promoted
to better jobs is not an entry-level position.
In sum, while there is nothing wrong in principle with employing persons
in non-ordinary ways, there should be a bias on the part of employers in favor of
inviting people to full participation in a community of work as ordinary
employees. This difference between full participation and less than full
participation in a community of work leads to a difference in the criteria of justice
to be applied.
JUSTICE IN ORDINARY EMPLOYMENT
The essential characteristic of the ordinary employee is that he or she is a
full participant in a community of work. Because this community of work,
whether it be a business, a non-profit organization of some sort, or a branch of
government, accepts or appropriates the full-time energies, skills, and creativity of
the employee, it has a corresponding duty to provide each employee with a share
of its available resources. This makes the problem of fairness in compensation for
ordinary employees a problem of distributive justice.
In other words, a compensation rate is not a price paid for work, but is
instead a share of a resource held by the community to which the worker belongs.
In this community the employer is the party who makes the judgments about
distribution and to the extent the employer is left free to do this, he or she must
attend to the rules and criteria of fairness proper to distributive justice.
Not every employee, of course, deserves the same share of the pool of
resources available for compensation. As a result, there need to be some criteria
for judging what differences among ordinary employees are relevant to
determining differences in compensation. Furthermore, market mechanisms have
a role to play in specifying how some of the criteria are to be calculated, though

19

Even part-time, temporary and seasonal employees, however, continue to be full members of the
civic community, which in many cases (particularly where a person cannot work full-time)
bears a responsibility to insure that these members can still satisfy their fundamental human
needs. To put it another way, the community has a duty to supplement from its own resources
what these employees can earn from their work.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2009

11

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 1 [2009], Art. 1

these mechanisms must be monitored to insure that they are functioning properly
and not distorted by external pressures.
The Principle of Dignity
The first and most fundamental principle of distributive justice in this area
has to do with human dignity. As discussed above, work is the ordinary way in
which persons acquire the material requirements of life for themselves and their
families. No one who contributes a full-time effort to a community of work and
performs at a satisfactory level should fail to receive an income that is minimally
sufficient to meet these requirements.20
Consequently, no one has a just claim on an income more than sufficient
to meet the requirements of decent human life until every member of the
community has received a minimum income. The difficulty of calculating this
minimum income should not be underestimated, nor should the difficulty
persuade people that it cannot be done.21 We should begin by remembering that
this rate of compensation is an estimate, not a precisely calculable number. We
should also keep in mind that it must include not only the cost of the absolute
essentials of life (e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, etc) but
also the cost of those things that make life decently human. In this category we
could include provisions for leisure and entertainment, religious practice,
aesthetic experience, participation in cultural events, access to communication
technologies, and so on.22 In estimating what level of income would be required
to achieve this in a particular community at a particular time23 it may often be
useful to apply the Golden Rule: What would the employer think would be a
minimally acceptable compensation package for himself or his adult children
were he in the position of the worker?

20

21

22

23

An exception, to be discussed below, is a situation in which an organization temporarily lacks
the resources necessary to provide every full-time employee with a minimum level of income.
Ryan made an attempt to model the calculation of a such a minimum income, with quaintly
amusing results. See The Living Wage, chapter VII, pp 123-150.
This does not mean that all full-time workers must be paid enough to buy season tickets at the
opera or the ball park, or that they should all have high-speed internet connections and satellite
television. It does mean that they should not have so little income that they cannot afford, in
contemporary America for example, a telephone, some means of transportation, an occasional
ticket to a movie, modest birthday presents for their children, and the like.
It should go without saying (and so I will say it in a footnote) that a minimum fair income will
always be a function of the cost of living in a particular place. A worker in Detroit may quite
reasonably expect to receive a higher absolute income than a worker in, say, Des Moines
Mexico, or Thailand.
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The Principle of Equity
As mentioned above, another fundamental rule of distributive justice is
that persons who are alike in relevant ways must be treated in the same way. In
the case of compensation, this means that persons holding the same job,
performing at more or less the same level, with the same prospects for future
growth, should be paid at the same level. This rule is famously violated if pay
differences are grounded in gender, race, age or other irrelevant characteristics,
but it may also be violated by considering such factors as education or personal
needs.24
The Principle of Contribution
Assuming the principle of dignity to be satisfied, different compensation
levels for employees can be fairly calculated according to the “value” of the
contribution they make to the organization’s operation. They should receive a
share of the compensation pool commensurate with the value they contribute.25
This is virtually impossible to calculate in the abstract and so it is reasonable to
rely on market mechanisms to make this determination. A market mechanism may
do one of two things. It may actually reflect the compensation demanded and
received by persons who have recently obtained a new job comparable to the one
under consideration, or it may be a sort of virtual market which would reflect the
compensation paid in other organizations to persons doing a very similar job.
This second sort of market mechanism, the virtual market, is used quite
commonly and Human Resource departments can devote a great deal of energy to
compiling information on compensation rates. Many organizations make a
commitment to insure that their employees will receive compensation within a
certain part of the range represented by such data. There is nothing inherently

24

Education can be a relevant factor if it increases employee competence or expands an
employee’s ability to manage the unexpected or to contribute to the organization in new ways in
the future, but it is probably not an appropriate principle if the education contributes little or
nothing to an individual employee’s performance.
25
While employers and employees often speak in terms of the “value” of a particular job, there is
little consistency in the means used to estimate value. Sometimes an employee might be
valuable because her skills are very scarce, which is the sort of thing a market measures well.
On the other hand, we might attribute value to the complexity or sophistication of the job, or to
the “dignity” (i.e., rank) of the employee, or the level of education required, or to seniority, or
even to the costs the organization would incur if an employee were not available to do the job.
The inconsistent, and therefore frequently unfair, use of such evaluative criteria is a common
source of confusion and frustration to employees and has led in the past to demands for
mechanisms for calculating “comparable worth.”
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unfair in this but there are a couple of signs that indicate that this market may not
be functioning properly.
Salary compression and salary inversion are signs of dysfunctional
markets. The test of a virtual market is whether it accurately reflects what
employees might receive if they were to obtain similar employment at another,
comparable organization. An organization that finds that it must pay new and
relatively inexperienced employees salaries quite close to what they pay long-time
experienced employees ought to reconsider its salary scales. And an organization
that finds it must pay new employees more than it pays its seasoned workers is
almost certainly exploiting the inertia, loyalty and ignorance of these employees.26
The Principle of Sustainability
No one responsible for distributing shares of a common resource can give
what the organization does not have. In some cases, an organization will not have
the resources to pay its employees fairly, perhaps not even to pay a minimum
wage. Justice does not demand that an organization do what it cannot do, but it
does require that the managers and directors of the organization consider the
future carefully.
Compensation rates are not fair if they threaten the survival of the
organization itself. However, this can happen in two very different ways. On the
one hand, an organization may be just beginning its operations and not yet have
achieved the success for which it reasonably hopes. There is no injustice if all
employees, including the managers, are underpaid temporarily in order to lay the
foundation for future success. However, the organization should be prepared to
repay employees, especially the employees at the bottom of the pay scale, the
compensation they were willing to forgo.27 Similarly, an established industry or a
region of a country may be experiencing a temporary setback that requires a
reduction in compensation. Such a reduction should fall first upon those most able
to bear it, but it would not be unjust to impose it eventually on every employee. In
both of these cases, however, the assumption is that the financial stress is
26

27

Many universities, for example, have found in recent years that the market for new PhD’s in
some fields is so demanding that they must offer starting salaries to assistant professors that are
close to or even higher than the salaries of tenured full professors. This should be a sign that
they should reevaluate the compensation of senior professors, but they may choose instead not
to adjust salaries but to exploit the reluctance of their senior people to seek positions at other
schools.
In many business start-ups this has been done by giving employees an equity stake in the
company, which can be enormously valuable if the company does well. There is always risk
involved for the employees of such companies but this risk does not mean that their conditions
of employment are unjust.
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temporary and there is some reason to believe that the lost income can eventually
be repaid in some way, especially to the poorer employees.
Quite a different situation exists in a failing organization or in an industry
facing a permanent contraction. In this case there is no reasonable prospect for the
organization to return to profitability and managers have a solemn responsibility
to bring operations to a close while the resources still exist to give employees and
creditors what they are due. Managers who continue operations in the
unreasonable hope that things will turn around unfairly place their employees and
creditors at great risk of loss.
CONCLUSION
Ordinary employees are fully participating members of a community of
work. Their compensation for contributing their full energies and talents is a share
in the resources of the organization, and so fairness here is a matter of distributive
justice. The criteria of distributive justice require first of all that basic needs be
met (and so there will be a minimum fair level of compensation) and secondly
that similar employees be treated similarly.
Differences in compensation will be justified to the degree that there are
genuine relevant differences in the employees and their performance or
contribution. Market mechanisms can be very helpful in identifying and
calculating the relative value of such differences, but these mechanisms are
subject to external pressures that can impede their proper function. Fair and
competent managers will be alert to signs that compensation markets are not
functioning well and will take corrective action.
In some special circumstances it may not be unfair to pay employees less
than a decent minimum, but these situations must be temporary and the real
possibility should exist to make good any employee losses.
Non-ordinary employees, as defined above, are not fully participating
members of communities of work and therefore fairness in compensation is not a
matter of distributive justice. It is instead a matter of commutative justice, which
demands equality in exchange. A compensation rate in non-ordinary employment,
then, is very much like a price.
As a practical matter, fairness in compensation for non-ordinary
employees can largely be a matter of market determinations and freedom to
contract. There is no obligation on the part of employers to provide compensation
adequate to meet all of the requirements of a decent human life. This is not to say
that people who work at part-time or temporary jobs do not deserve an adequate
income, but merely to acknowledge that it is not solely or perhaps even primarily
the responsibility to the employer to insure that income.
Fairness may be presumed to exist where non-ordinary employees have
some choices about where to work and employers have choices about whom to

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2009

15

Journal of Religion and Business Ethics, Vol. 1 [2009], Art. 1

employ, where both parties are free from unusual pressures, and where each has
adequate knowledge about the matter.28 Where these conditions do not exist,
managers have a duty in justice to take corrective action, and employees have a
duty not to exploit the occasional vulnerability of employers. The scarcity or
abundance of workers may cause wages to rise or fall significantly without
creating an injustice, though such changes can create opportunities for
mischievous employers or employees.
The situation of entry-level employees presents a special case. On the one
hand, they are often invited to join a community of work and they are expected to
become ordinary employees at some future time. On the other hand, they typically
lack the skills and experience necessary for them to participate fully in this
community. They are, in some respects, like apprentices. As a result, it will
normally be fair to pay them something less than a minimum decent wage
because they cannot yet make an adequate contribution to the organization and,
correspondingly, because the organization is investing something in the training
they receive.
In a market economy, where the State honors and protects the freedom of
people to enter freely into contracts, and where it intervenes in the marketplace
largely to take corrective action to insure the proper functioning of markets,
employers and owners of resources have considerable economic freedom. This
freedom to organize the work of others, to make and sell what they wish, and to
employ whom they wish carries with it some serious obligations. Among these
obligations is the duty to insure as far as possible that all of their employees are
paid fairly.
The employment relationship is not normally the exchange of labor for a
wage; it is commonly participation in a community of work. For ordinary
employees who do participate fully in a community of work, fairness in
compensation is determined by the principles of distributive justice, with special
emphasis given to the protection of the human dignity of the employee. For other,
non-ordinary employees, who do not participate fully (or perhaps at all) in a
community of work, fairness in compensation is determined by the principles of
commutative justice.
In either case, given the variables at play and the limited tools available
for measuring those variables, fairness in compensation is never a precise figure

28

At the risk of redundancy, we must remember that employers, who de facto control access to
employment, a fundamental human good, have an obligation to make ordinary employment
available whenever possible. Thus, even employers who pay an objectively fair wage to nonordinary employees may still do them an injustice if they deliberately deny them the ordinary
jobs they want and ought to have.
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but is instead a range determined by a conscientious application of the principles
of justice.
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